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 Research focused on the inconsistencies in Spain’s citizenship scheme exceptions states 
Spain’s political parties will not address the exclusion of Western Sahara from the scheme until 
there is a Sahrawi referendum for self-determination. My thesis uses documents from 2016, 
2017, and 2018 to show that parties within the lower chamber of Spanish Parliament have begun 
to consistently address the issue, calling into question the belief that the issue will remain 
unresolved until a future referendum. My research first explains to the reader the exceptions 
created in Spain’s citizenship scheme to favor applicants from post-colonial space and applicants 
who have close blood ties to Spain, then shows how this historical link should include Western 
Sahara. I employ the works of previous researchers and government documents to show why this 
exclusion has historically occurred, then use the past three years of government action to show 
how the Spanish government indeed has begun to address the issue, making it impossible to 
definitively conclude that Spain will continue to deny Sahrawi applicants for Spanish citizenship 
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CHAPTER 1: SPAIN’S CITIZENSHIP POLICY EXCEPTIONS 
Introduction 
Spain’s citizenship scheme is contradictory in how it treats the majority of its post-
colonial space and how it treats Western Sahara. Spain’s citizenship scheme, which favors 
citizens of countries previously colonized by Spain, allowing them the ability to apply for 
Spanish citizenship without losing their citizenship by birth and requiring fewer years of 
residence than other applicants, is highly consistent in how it treats applicants from previous 
colonies except for those from Western Sahara, who as a whole at present cannot apply for 
Spanish citizenship with reduced requirements. While the history behind why Western Sahara 
finds itself in limbo, occupied by Morocco, and unable to conduct the UN-supported referendum 
of self-determination are clearly documented, there is little academic conjecture over how 
Spain’s citizenship scheme is affected by the political reality of Western Sahara’s status. While 
there is some discussion about Western Sahara in Spain, little information interprets current 
discussions in Spain’s government regarding the status of Sahrawi applicants for Spanish 
citizenship and this blaring inconsistency in Spain’s citizenship scheme. Previous scholarship 
assumes that Spain’s political institutions will not address the exclusion of Western Sahara from 
Spain’s citizenship exceptions. This thesis shows that within the past three years Spanish 
Parliament has consistently and strongly debated the issue, calling into question the assumption 
that Spain’s policy will not change until there is a self-determination referendum in Western 
Sahara. This thesis agrees with previous scholars that inconsistencies in Spain’s citizenship 
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policy, which privileges citizens of all previous colonies except for Western Sahara, is a 
reflection of Western Sahara’s political status, but diverges from previous research by showing 
that Western Sahara’s exclusion is finally being called into question by Spanish government, 
though it is still unclear when a change to Spain’s civil code to rectify this inconsistency will 
occur.  
Rather than beginning with the history of Spanish citizenship in Western Sahara, I start 
with the two other case studies that explain current citizenship exceptions in Spain in order to 
establish an understanding of Spain’s current scheme and the history behind it. The first case 
study is Spain’s history of granting express citizenship to Sephardic Jews and the second is 
Spain’s agreements allowing faster acquisition of dual citizenship with previous colonies: Ibero-
American countries – Latin American countries where Spanish and Portuguese are official 
languages – Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, the Philippines, and Portugal.1 These cases illustrate 
Spain’s commitment to granting special privileges to post-colonial space regarding citizenship,2 
while making it harder for citizens of countries not historically tied to Spain to obtain 
nationality.3 Proclamations by the Spanish government are used to show the official acceptance 
of this historical precedent within Spanish citizenship law. These examples, as well as key works 
by scholars like Ruiz Miguel and Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes, will be used to show how 
                                                 
1 Spain, Ministerio de Justicia, Tener la doble nacionalidad. Gerencias Territoriales Del Ministerio De Justicia - 




2 Claudia Finotelli, Maria Caterina, and Barbera La, "When the Exception Becomes the Rule: The Spanish 









Western Sahara should be included in the scheme and how current debate centers around 
amending the law to include Western Sahara, but remains unresolved. Current debate within 
Spain’s congress shows in no uncertain terms the harsh words for Morocco that certain political 
parties in Spain use while attempting to draft the law, while current trade relations with Morocco 
will show the precarious position Western Sahara holds in negotiations between Spain, the 
European Union, and Morocco. Updated conjecture by Spanish government officials will be key 
to interpreting the importance of the Western Sahara dispute in entrenching this inconsistency in 
Spain’s citizenship scheme. A limitation to the research is that little academic speculation about 
the exclusion of Western Sahara exists, making this analysis framed mainly by primary sources 
and partially contradicting primarily the article by Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes. Though 
limited academic conjecture exists, the primary documents solidify the argument that Spain has 
consistently addressed the incongruence over the past three years, deviating from its previous 
trajectory and calling into question existing speculation about when this inconsistency might be 
resolved. 
The Case of Sephardic Jews 
 Sephardic Jews, or Sephardim, are Jews from the Iberian Peninsula and their 
descendants. The Alhambra Decree of March 31, 1492 codified the expulsion of these Jews from 
the kingdoms of Aragón and Castilla4 and was followed by its Navarrese counterpart in 1498 
after pressure from the Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella,5 leading to centuries of 
persecution and Inquisition and the dispersal of those expelled to countries like Portugal, Greece, 
                                                 
4 César Vidal Manzanares, España Frente a Los Judíos Sefarad: Del Profeta Jonás a La Expulsión (Barcelona: 
Planeta DeAgostini, 2008), 212. 
 
5 Benjamin R. Gampel, The Last Jews on Iberian Soil Navarrese Jewry, 1479-1498 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 120. 
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Morocco, Italy, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, and the Americas.6 Spain has a nearly 
140-year-old legacy of sympathizing with Sephardim and using them as a political tool in North 
African conflicts. Spanish citizenship by acquisition is traditionally one of the hardest in Europe 
to obtain, even for fellow European Union citizens.7 Sephardic Jews, however, became the focal 
point of internal and external policymaking in the late 1800s. In 1881, following Spanish military 
incursions in North Africa,8 sephardophilia and philosemitism began to spread after reports of 
thousands of Spanish faces amongst the Sephardim of Morocco reached the general Spanish 
public.9 Emilio Castelar, orator and openly sephardophilic10 head of government in 1881,11 and 
Ángel Pulido, a doctor and lifelong senator whose travels to the Danube in 1903 brought him 
into contact with the Sephardic community, are credited with bringing the Sephardic plight to 
Spain’s political arena.12 Pulido’s book, Españoles sin patria, or Spaniards without a 
Fatherland, perfectly sums up the sentiment of the time,13 though anti-Semitism certainly existed 
in Spain at the time as well.14 From this time on, sephardophilia and philosemitism gradually 
                                                 
6 Jonathan S. Ray, After Expulsion 1492 and the Making of Sephardic Jewry (New York: NYU Press, 2013). 
 
7 Finotelli, Caterina and La, "When the Exception Becomes the Rule,” 246. 
 
8 Adolfo Kuznitzky, "La Ciudadanía Española y Los Sefardíes. Razones históricas/The Spanish Citizenship and the 




9 Ibid., 124-5. 
 
10 Nitai Shinan, “Emilio Castelar y los judíos: una reevaluación.” Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos. 
Sección Hebreo, 2016 65: 101; 112-3. http://meahhebreo.com/index.php/meahhebreo/article/view/891/1011 
 
11 Kuznitzky. "La Ciudadanía Española y Los Sefardíes. Razones históricas.” 24. 
 
12 Ibid., 24. 
 
13 Ibid., 24-5. 
 




increase the reconnection of Spain to the Sephardic community. As part of agreements with the 
Ottoman Empire prior to its collapse, the Christian states of Europe had agreements called 
capitulations that granted certain privileges to Christians who resided in the Empire, an 
agreement Sephardim were also included in. In 1924, Miguel Primo de Rivera wrote a decree 
that granted full citizenship to those with protected status if they applied before December 31, 
1930.15 This included Sephardic Jews, though only a minority of those eligible applied.16 During 
the Franco dictatorship, Franco also extended Sephardic Jews of certain countries the right to 
apply for citizenship. On December 30, 1948, Franco published a decree authorizing Sephardim 
residing in Greece and Egypt to apply for citizenship provided they “‘show[ed] they [were] 
worthy of such mercy.’”17 The proclamation came after the protections of Sephardic Jews 
negotiated with the Ottoman Empire in 1837 and subsequent agreements with Greece and Egypt 
in 1936, expired in 1948.18  
Spain’s citizenship law saw further revision after re-democratization, when the Civil 
Code of 1982 was changed to allow Sephardim to apply for Spanish citizenship after only two 
years of legal residence in Spain.19 This is the first expression of Sephardic citizenship that 
places Sephardim in the same category as the second case study – applicants from Spain’s 
previous colonies. According to Article 2 of the 1982 Civil Code, while applicants from previous 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 23-4. 
 
16 Ibid., 23-4. 
 






19 Spain, Jefatura del Estado, "Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial Del Estado." Reference Num. BOE-A-1982-19493. 




colonies did not lose their previous citizenship upon acquiring Spanish citizenship, other 
applicants, including Sephardim, were not protected in the same way. Additionally, all other 
applicants for citizenship are required to reside in Spain for ten years, unless they were born on 
Spanish soil, born abroad to one or two Spanish parents, have been married to a Spaniard, or 
have not exercised the right to citizenship by option, in which case, the 1982 law allows them to 
reside in Spain only one year.20 The Civil Code was again altered in 2015, when law 12/2015 
took effect on June 24th. This law finally brought Sephardim to the same level as the other 
exceptional cases, allowing Sephardic applicants to retain their previous citizenship, permitting 
dual nationality, by altering article 23 of the Civil Code.21 Section three of the law states that:  
In short, the current Law hopes to be the point of encounter between modern Spaniards 
and the descendants of those who were unjustly expelled starting in 1492, and justifies 
itself with the common goal of together constructing, in the face of the intolerance of the 
past, a new space of cohabitation and concordance, that forever reopens for the expelled 
communities the gates of their old country.22 
Unlike the other exceptional cases, however, the 2015 law removed the two-year residency 
requirement for Sephardim, citing exceptional circumstances.23 Those who seek citizenship by 
this method first must apply online in Spanish with the Ministry of Justice.24 They must pass the 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 20626. 
 
21 Spain. Jefatura del Estado. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial Del Estado Núm. 151. Madrid, Madrid, 2015. 52559. 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/06/25/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-7045.pdf. 
 
22 Ibid., 52559. 
 
23 Ibid., 52558. 
 





official DELE Spanish language exams with an A2 level or higher according to the European 
framework, unless they are already certified at that level or are from countries where Spanish is 
the native language.25 In addition, applicants must pass an exam about the Spanish Constitution 
and cultural knowledge, called the CCSE, unless the applicants are under 18 years of age or 
mentally handicapped.26 They have to prove being Sephardic of Spanish origin, whatever their 
current belief system, and they must provide evidence of a special connection to Spain.27 In order 
to prove Sephardic origin, Article 1.2 of the law stipulates that there is no maximum number of 
documents needed, but the following are among those accepted: certificates issued by the 
President of the Permanent Commission of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain or 
the Jewish community of the applicant’s city of origin or residence, accompanied by a certificate 
of legal rabbinic authority of the issuer in said country, or other documents proving Sephardic 
origin.28 These documents can be certified genealogies showing unequivocally Spanish, 
Sephardic surnames from the time of expulsion along with explanations for surname alterations 
due to adopted languages in an applicant’s country of residence; the use of Ladino, a language 
combining Spanish with Hebrew and other influences, or haketia,29 duly certified by a competent 
organization; or official birth certificates or ketubot – marriage certificates – celebrated and 
written in the Spanish rite, accompanied by official rabbinic certification.30  
                                                 
25 Ibid., 88639. 
 
26 Ibid., 88639. 
 
27 Ibid., 88636. 
 
28 Ibid., 88640-2. 
 
29 Spain, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación, Embajada De España en Tel Aviv, Ley 
12/2015 en materia de concesión de la nacionalidad española a los sefardíes originarios de España, October 10, 
2015. http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Embajadas/TELAVIV/es/Noticias/Paginas/Articulos/20150617_NOT1.aspx. 
 




 Verification of a special connection to Spain can be demonstrated with documentation 
proving ancestral connections to the Sephardim naturalized in the 1948 and 1924 royal decrees,31 
marriage or direct relation to Spanish nationals, “…holding shares in a Spanish company, 
owning a house or other goods in Spain, having studied abroad in a Spanish city, having a 
Spanish business contract, being a patron of Spanish institutions that develop charitable 
activities, scientific or cultural organizations, making a donation to Spanish charitable 
organizations…” and more.32 To prove these documents authentic, they must be translated and 
certified by diplomatic services or by local services that are certified and apostilled.33 After a 
background check, which must be federal for applicants from federal states, a designated notary 
will confirm the receipt of the necessary documents and request the applicant to present 
themselves in Spain for the signing of the attested affidavit.34 Applicants are then issued a 
Spanish birth certificate after paying a fee.35 Applicants were given three years from the law’s 
start to submit their applications, however, the time limit can be prolonged by one year when 
agreed on by the Council of Ministers36 and remains open in exceptional and humanitarian 
cases.37 The law was again altered in 2017, when the General Directorate of Registries and 
Notaries decided that applicants over the age of seventy no longer needed to take the Spanish 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 88642. 
 
32 Ibid., 88643. 
 
33 Ibid., 88643. 
 
34 Ibid., 88643-4. 
 
35 Ibid., 88645. 
 
36 Spain. Jefatura del Estado. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial Del Estado Núm. 151. 52560. 
 




language exam or the constitution and cultural exam based on non-discrimination laws applied to 
law 12/2015 and the difficulty of learning the required material in advanced age.38  
The Case of Ibero-American Countries and Previous Colonies 
 Spain’s citizenship scheme also grants special status to people from previous colonies. 
Citizens of Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and Ibero-American countries, 
or countries in the Americas that once formed part of Spain and Portugal whose official 
languages include Spanish and Portuguese, do not lose their previous citizenship when applying 
for Spanish citizenship.39 The historical and cultural connection between Spain, Latin America, 
and the Philippines is well documented, but the exceptions made for Andorra, Portugal, and 
Equatorial Guinea are worth pointing out as they illustrate the point in the case of the European 
exceptions that historical connections to Spain are more important than the power of other 
European Union countries when it comes to who can become Spanish and that there are 
countries in Africa that are given special status, calling into question the current exclusion of 
Western Sahara. 
 Article 24 of Spain’s 1931 Constitution established the basis for today’s policy, granting 
citizenship reciprocity to Spanish-speaking countries, Portugal, and Brazil, but failing to 
establish bilateral agreements guaranteeing other countries’ participation in this law, allowing for 
                                                 
38 Spain. Ministerio de Justicia. Dirección General De Los Registros Y Del Norariado. Ministerio de Justicia. By 





Also found in: Miguel González, "Justicia Exime De Examen Para Ser Español a Los Sefardíes Mayores 
De 70 Años," El País, February 25, 2017. 
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/02/22/actualidad/1487786555_712348.html. 
 





the possibility of other countries to not recognize dual nationality in the same way.40 On July 15, 
1954, Article 22 of Spain’s Civil Code was modified to allow Spaniards who obtained 
nationality in Ibero-American countries or the Philippines to keep their nationality when 
permitted by the other country.41 A series of bilateral agreements with Spanish-speaking Latin 
American countries began in the fifties and continued into the seventies and eighties, when the 
last country to sign the agreements, Colombia, signed.42 For certain countries, notably “…Chile, 
Perú, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica [and] Honduras,” dual nationality is 
allowed to be reciprocal provided only one citizenship be considered effective, or active, at any 
given time, with the country of residence taking precedence.43 In the 1950s and 60s, “…12 
bilateral agreements on dual nationality were signed with Latin American countries, namely: 
Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Colombia.”44 The 1954 changes to the Civil Code were 
directed at Spaniards who had moved to Latin America and their children, allowing first and 
                                                 
40 Antonio Marín López, "La Doble Nacionalidad En Los Tratados Suscritos Por España Con Las Repúblicas 




 Also found in: Alberto Martín-Pérez and Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes, "Migration and Citizenship 
Law in Spain: Path-dependency and Policy Change in a Recent Country of Immigration," International Migration 
Review 46, no. 3 (2012): 633, doi:10.1111/j.1747-7379.2012.00899.x.  
 …and in Alberto Martín Pérez and Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, "Dealing with Loopholes in National 
and EU Citizenship: Spanish Nationality in the Case of Western Sahara," The Reconceptualization of European 
Union Citizenship, May 14, 2014. 156, doi:10.1163/9789004251526_009. 
 
41 Marín López, "La Doble Nacionalidad En Los Tratados Suscritos Por España,” 221. 
 
42 Ibid., 222-3. 
 
43 Ibid., 223. 
 
44 Alberto Martín-Pérez and Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes, "Migration and Citizenship Law in Spain: Path-





second generation nationals to maintain citizenship without registering with the local Spanish 
embassy, but also set the framework for today’s dual nationality agreement with Ibero-American 
countries.45 The changes lowered the residence requirement for citizens of these countries and 
the Philippines to the current standard of two years.46  Article 11 of Spain’s 1978 constitution 
stipulates that: 
The State may negotiate dual nationality treaties with Latin-American countries or with 
those which have had or which have special links with Spain. In these countries, 
Spaniards may become naturalised without losing their nationality of origin, even if said 
countries do not recognise a reciprocal right to their own citizens.47 
This sets a clear historical precedent within Spanish citizenship law, entitling those from 
countries deemed close to Spain historically, as seen by the Spanish government, to dual 
nationality. Though they cannot enforce the laws of other countries, this law established the right 
of Spanish citizens to obtain another nationality without losing their Spanish nationality in the 
eyes of the Spanish government. This was done in a joint political attempt following re-
democratization, with the right supporting the move due to nationalistic and pan-Hispanic 
sentiments48 and the left supporting the protection of the rights of Spaniards who had fled the 
country or were exiled during Franco’s rule.49  
                                                 
45 Ibid., 635. 
 
46 Ibid., 635-6.  
 
47 Spain. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial Del Estado. The Spanish Constitution. Accessed February 04, 2019, pg. 10-
11, paragraph 3. https://www.boe.es/legislacion/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf. 
 Also found in: Marín López. "La Doble Nacionalidad En Los Tratados Suscritos Por España.” 221. 
 
48 Martín-Pérez and Moreno-Fuentes, "Migration and Citizenship Law in Spain,” 635-6. 
 




 Spain’s Civil Code changed again in 1982 to include Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Portugal in the list of countries with which Spaniards can maintain dual nationality. The Civil 
Code was amended so that citizens of those countries, along with citizens of Ibero-American 
countries, can obtain Spanish citizenship after a two-year period of legal residence in Spain that 
is continuous and occurs immediately before the petition for citizenship.50 Spain’s law remains 
unchanged, with the Ministry of Justice elaborating on its dual nationality agreements, stating 
that “It is unnecessary to renounce one’s nationality for citizens of Ibero-American countries, 
Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, or Portugal.”51 Ibero-American countries 
specifically exclude Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Jamaica, though Puerto Rico is 
considered Ibero-American.52 
 The application process requires applicants to fill out an online application form, have 
their foreigners’ I.D. card,53 current passport from the applicant’s country of origin, translated 
and notarized birth certificate, notarized and translated background check from the applicant’s 
country of origin, marriage certificate if the applicant is married, 102€ application fee receipt, a 
Central Register of Convicted Persons and Rebels-administered background check, a certificate 
of local residence in Spain, an Instituto Cervantes-issued Spanish diploma (DELE) when 
necessary, and positive Spanish constitution and cultural exam (CCSE) results.54 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 222; 225. 
 




53Spain. Ministerio del Interior. "Tarjeta De Identidad De Extranjero." Servicios Al Ciudadano. 2013. Accessed 
February 04, 2019. http://www.interior.gob.es/web/servicios-al-ciudadano/extranjeria/regimen-general/tarjeta-de-
identidad-de-extranjero. 
 This I.D. card must already have been issued by the Spanish government and certifies a foreigner’s legal 
residence within Spain. 
 
54 Spain. Ministerio de Justicia. Gerencias Territoriales Del Ministerio De Justicia - Cartas De Servicios - 
Ministerio De Justicia. Accessed February 04, 2019. 
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Joint Characteristics of Case Studies One and Two  
Both of these case studies show that Spain’s citizenship scheme is designed to favor 
countries and people with special connections to Spain and its history. The other cases of 
Spanish citizenship by residency are far more demanding. The usual legal residency period in 
Spain prior to applying to citizenship involves ten years of uninterrupted legal residence in Spain 
completed immediately prior to applying for citizenship unless the applicant is a refugee, in 
which case the residency requirement is five years, or unless the applicant was born in Spanish 
territory, has not exercised their right to Spanish nationality by option, has been legally married 
one year to a Spaniard, has a legal guardian from Spain and has been under their care for two 
years, is the widow or widower of a Spanish citizen who died while the couple was still together, 
or is the direct decedent of a Spanish citizen by second degree. In all of these later cases, the time 
of legal residence before applying for Spanish citizenship is one year.55 Indeed, Spain is 
described as a restrictive country with arguably one of the most difficult paths to citizenship for 
applicants, unless they hail from countries with a special connection to the old Empire and 
Spanish heritage.56 The law does not favor European citizens, save those from Portugal and 
Andorra, which both have been part of the Spanish Empire in the past, meaning that most E.U. 
citizens do not have the right to obtain Spanish citizenship by residency and retain their current 
nationality, despite cultural proximity and certain political unions.57 Luckily for these applicants, 
though, as long as they have a current residence permit in Spain, it is possible to leave the 






56 Finotelli, Caterina and La, "When the Exception Becomes the Rule,” 245-6. 
 




country for work, study, or other justifiable reasons.58 In general, the strong adherence to ius 
sanguinis and post-colonial preferences ethnicize Spain’s citizenship laws, while its history 
encourages Spaniards who were displaced to maintain connections to their homeland.59 
Throughout the past century, Spain’s citizenship law operates with a path dependency rooted in a 
mission to protect Spanish citizens, their decedents, and people with special connections to 
Spain’s history.60 In the twenty years prior to 2012, when laws have been proposed in Parliament 
to liberalize Spain’s citizenship scheme to focus more on integration of immigrants through 
naturalization, the efforts had been stifled, save the case of political refugees, whose residency 
requirement was reduced to five years in 1990.61 The focus on historical connections to Spain 
over the importance of integrating residents through expedited naturalization processes extended 
into the 2002, when the government repeatedly passed laws enforcing the importance of ius 
sanguinis over ius solis, focusing on Spanish citizenship by origin.62 Right wing parties into the 
mid-2000s reinforced existing policy objectives because they sought to protect Spanish nationals 
abroad, while the Spanish left “…claim[ed] to be protecting the ‘victims’ of the structural 
underdevelopment of Spain and its historical lack of democracy.”63 Because both parties 
approach the topic of citizenship with similar goals, despite different reasoning, Spain’s 
citizenship scheme has entrenched its exceptional cases into current legislation. The largest 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 247-8. 
 
59 Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes, "Migration and Citizenship Law in Spain,” 631-2. 
 
60 Ibid., 641. 
 
61 Ibid., 641. 
 
62 Ibid., 642-3. 
 




population of immigrants naturalizing after legal residents in in the mid-2000s was Latin 
Americans, while Europeans who already enjoy rights to work and live in Spain as part of the 
European Union are less likely to apply for citizenship,64 as they would lose their other 
citizenship and there is little incentive given the extensiveness of European Union movement 
rights.  
Spain’s 2015 law removing the residence requirement for Sephardic Jews presents the 
perfect example of how modern citizenship law in Spain is inherently linked to the past, 
dedicating two pages to the history of the Expulsion and the pain it caused.65 The end of the 
preamble focuses on the need to reencounter and achieve reconciliation with the Sephardic 
community and the following section is dedicated to all of the ways in which Spain has 
historically, since the reign of Isabel II in the 1800s, attempted to reconcile its history with the 
Sephardic community and Jewish community at large.66 This section and the two previous 
establish the importance of history in the path dependence of Spanish citizenship law and set the 
basis for the following sections on Western Sahara, which does not enjoy the same privileges as 
other previous Spanish colonies.67 The following sections focus on the historical connections 
between Western Sahara and Spain, the exclusion of Western Sahara from today’s citizenship 
exceptions, reasons for this exclusion, and the efforts within Spain’s government to close the gap 
in its citizenship scheme that leaves Western Sahara behind, but makes special concessions for 
nationals of all other post-colonial space. They show that while the exclusion of Western Sahara 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 647. 
 
65 Spain. Jefatura del Estado. Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial Del Estado Núm. 151. 52557-8. 
 
66 Ibid., 52557-8. 
 
67 Alberto Martín Pérez and Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes, "Dealing with Loopholes in National and EU 
Citizenship: Spanish Nationality in the Case of Western Sahara," The Reconceptualization of European Union 
Citizenship, May 14, 2014. 149, doi:10.1163/9789004251526_009. 
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from this scheme reflects preexisting tensions between Spain and the European Union and 
Morocco, recent developments within Spain’s government call into question previous scholar’s 
assertion that Western Sahara will continue to be excluded until there is a self-determination 
referendum in Western Sahara or other significant change in the region.
17 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE EXCLUSION OF WESTERN SAHARA: 
Introduction 
Current research on Spanish citizenship policy focuses heavily on the Sephardic Jewish 
case because it is the highest profile case due to international media coverage. In the leadup to 
the 2015 changes in Spain’s Civil Code regarding Sephardim, a list of allegedly Sephardic 
surnames circulated the internet, causing many in countries as far away as Brazil to become 
excited at the prospect of obtaining Spanish nationality because of a supposed Sephardic 
surname.68 The list spread quickly on social media throughout several Latin American countries 
and gained so much fame that the Spanish Ministry of Justice issued a statement clarifying that 
there was no such official list of approved surnames.69 According to São Paulo rabbi Samy Pinto, 
approximately one quarter of those who came looking for some proof of Sephardic origin were 
motivated primarily by their desire to legally live and work in Europe.70 The announcement to 
liberalize Spain’s Civil Code regarding Sephardic Jews was made on February 7, 2014, by 
Rajoy’s government,71 and as previously discussed not implemented until 2015. Despite the 
focus on the Sephardic case caused by the propagation of this list, Martín Pérez and Moreno 
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Fuentes’s article, published in The Reconceptualization of European Union Citizenship, 
compiled one of the most comprehensive studies on Spanish citizenship prior to January 2014, 
when the book and article were published, including certain aspects of the special cases 
previously mentioned as well as the exclusion of Western Sahara from Spain’s citizenship 
scheme.72 While the article succinctly summarizes the history of events prior to 2014 that cause 
the exclusion of Western Sahara from Spain’s citizenship scheme, it was published just before 
Spanish citizenship law caught the attention of the world stage, leading to certain flaws in its 
argument surrounding Western Sahara, which will be discussed in this section. 
Western Sahara’s Historical Connection to Spain 
The history covered in the article explains that Western Sahara used to be a Spanish 
colony before the decolonization of Africa. The territory is located in the northwest coast of 
Africa and boarders Morocco, Mauritania, and Algeria, and became a Spanish protectorate in 
1884.73 Spain granted citizenship to all 32,000 subjects living within Western Saharan territory 
in 1958, when it was named an autonomous region of Spain.74 International pressures from 
parties like the United Nations during the decolonization of Africa called on Spain to hold a 
referendum on Saharawi self-determination, but it was not until near the end of Franco’s reign 
that Spain decided to do so,75 though the referendum was never held. Spain, given political 
instability surrounding the encroaching end of Franco’s regime, agreed to a tripartite 
administration of Western Sahara between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain, though the 
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International Court of Justice declared the former two’s claims over the territory illegitimate.76 
After Spain withdrew from Western Sahara as part of its agreement with the other two countries, 
Morocco and Mauritania invaded and agreed on a dual partition of the territory in April 1976 
prior to Mauritania’s relinquishing of its claim in 1979 and subsequent military withdrawal.77 
Morocco currently claims sovereignty of the territory. While many Sahrawis fled to Tindouf, 
Algeria, where an estimated 170,000 people remain in camps, “[t]he remainder of the population 
either stayed…in Western Saharan territory under Moroccan control, or lives in a small portion 
of the territory in the east of Western Sahara controlled by the Polisario Front, which claims the 
right to self-determination for the former Spanish colony.”78 According to some scholars, 
Western Sahara remains the only non-autonomous territory within Africa that is still pending 
decolonization, awaiting an independence referendum79 that the international community has 
proven incapable of effectively promoting and executing.80 This operates in contrast to the view 
some scholars hold which is that Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara can be seen as “…the 
integration of Western Sahara into the Kingdom of Morocco as a partial reconstruction of an old 
African polity dismembered by European partition.”81 Regardless of the interpretation of the 
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post-colonial political process that occurred following Spanish withdrawal from the region, the 
present reality is that Moroccan political goals stand in contrast to present day Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR), Spanish, and U.N. goals. 
Legal Reasons for Spain’s Exclusion 
Royal Decree 2258/1976 allowed certain Western Saharans the right to retain their 
Spanish citizenship provided they apply to retain their citizenship with Spanish authorities within 
one year.82 The majority of Sahrawis lost their citizenship in the eyes of the Spanish government 
due to noncompliance with this decree.83 Further complicating the issue is that thousands of 
Sahrawis fled the territory as Morocco invaded during the period from 1975 through 1976,84 
prior to the Royal Decree’s publishing in August 1976,85 meaning that applying to retain 
citizenship would have been difficult for a significant number of then Spanish citizens. In 1976, 
many Sahrawis first fled to the interior of Western Sahara, and then to Algeria due to Moroccan 
forces bombing the territory. It is unlikely many of those who fled were even aware of the Royal 
Decree, or that they would have been able to apply to retain their citizenship with Spanish civil 
authorities if they were aware.86 Because Sahrawis were made to appear before a judge of the 
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Civil Registry in their place of Spanish residence within one year in order to retain citizenship, 
rather than being allowed to could go to consular registries to apply to retain it, it was difficult to 
retain Spanish citizenship.87 This “…indirectly obliged [them] to take on the nationality of 
another country (steering them to adopt Moroccan or Mauritanian [citizenship]).”88 Ruiz Miguel 
points to a major inconsistency in Spanish citizenship law by asserting that there is a clear case 
expressing the invalidity of Royal Decree 2258/1976 for several reasons. The first is that Spain’s 
Civil Code in 1976 expressly states that Spanish nationality cannot be removed unless another 
nationality is voluntarily acquired by a Spanish citizen, or unless the citizen is sanctioned by the 
government, or a women with Spanish citizenship loses it by marrying a non-Spaniard – a 
section of the law that has since changed.89 The Civil Code in Spain supersedes Royal Decrees, 
which should render Royal Decree 2258/1976 invalid.90 In a 1998 case in Spain’s Supreme 
Court, a Sahrawi applicant, Mr. Badadi Mohamed Mulud, applied for the renewal of his Spanish 
passport. which was originally valid from 1973 to 1978, and other Spanish documents.91 While 
the courts approved his specific case, they made the conditions for approval difficult, 
“…strongly limiting the possibility a general solution to the problem for the Sahrawi 
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population.”92  The courts avoided making a ruling that directly contradicted Royal Decree 
2258/1976, preventing a ruling that would benefit Western Saharans as a whole, but likely result 
in a substantial increase in citizenship applications or renewals of expired Spanish nationality 
documents. In the above case, the applicant was applying for the renewal of citizenship 
documents as a Spaniard by origin, meaning that the applicant was previously a Spanish citizen 
either born to a Spanish parent, born on Spanish soil to foreign at least one foreign parent born in 
Spain, born to parents in Spain whose countries of origin do not grant him/her citizenship, born 
in Spain to unknown parents, or adopted before turning 18 by Spanish parents.93 Because Mr. 
Badadi was applying for the renewal of documents proving his Spanish citizenship by origin and 
the Royal Decree specifically took away Sahrawis’ citizenship by origin, the Supreme Court 
ought to have ruled on the validity of 2258/1976, but it instead skirted the issue and left this hole 
in Spanish citizenship policy open.94  
Royal Decree 2258/1976 further contradicts Spanish law in that it claims to have been 
granted the power to remove Sahrawis’ citizenship by article 19 of the Civil Code, an article that 
“…established the possibility of acquiring Spanish nationality by… [a person] who was 
previously not Spanish, through the process of naturalization…”95 Sahrawis were clearly legally 
Spanish at the time the decree was issued, making this particular reference and legal application 
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invalid. If the Royal Decree is considered null, as proposed by Ruiz Miguel, then Article 11.2 of 
the Spanish Constitution, which states that no Spaniard by origin can have their citizenship 
revoked, ought to be applied to people from Western Sahara as well.96 This decree is one of the 
main obstacles to a comprehensive solution for Western Saharan inclusion in Spain’s citizenship 
scheme
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CHAPTER 3: ADDRESSING THE INCONGRUENCE IN SPAIN’S CITIZENSHIP 
POLICY 
 
Spain’s Current Stance 
 Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes state that Spain’s political parties remain silent about 
the current loophole in Spain’s citizenship policy that makes exceptions for countries or people 
with a special connection to Spain, except for Western Sahara, because there has not been 
significant change to Western Sahara’s political status;97 however,  in the past three years there 
has been a drastic change in the discussion, with the lower chamber of Parliament devoting 
several important rulings on the issue. Before addressing the current changes in the government’s 
dialogue, I address the scholarship that shows how Spain previously treated the issue publicly. 
As Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes point out, in the mid-2000s the issue reached Spanish 
regional and appeals courts. In Córdoba, in 2008, around 700 Sahrawis successfully applied for 
citizenship using their old Spanish documents, such as birth certificates and DNIs, or national 
identification documents, issued before the Moroccan invasion.98 Spain’s Ministry of Justice 
initially responded favorably to the applications, treating the applications as a recognition of 
nationality rather than a renewal, as in Mr. Badadi’s 1998 case with the Supreme Court.99 In 
2009, however, a State Attorney appealed against many of the existing cases, citing negligent 
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administrative procedure or invalid conditions for application for new Spanish identification 
documents.100 New cases were also denied after the district attorney took action to stop the Civil 
Registry from allowing Sahrawis to apply for updated citizenship documents.101 This led to many 
of the applicants losing their Spanish citizenship for a second time in their lives,102 with some 
applicants unable to leave the country while in limbo. This applicant, Sabia Bushab Bubaquer, 
had hoped to pass her Spanish nationality onto her children, who she now fears will not have that 
right, as Spain withdrew her citizenship as part of this incident.103 This touches on a previous 
point: that the government is making it hard for large quantities of Sahrawis to apply for updated 
citizenship documents. With the 700 applications for citizenship papers in one year alone, it is 
likely that more would apply and pass on their citizenship to their children as well. This is the 
right of any Spanish citizen, but in granting Sahrawi applicants citizenship en masse, the Spanish 
government would have to be ready to face a growing responsibility for the violation of its 
citizens’ rights at the expense of Morocco, the power that has kept Western Sahara from 
realizing its independence referendum for over forty years. Had the Supreme Court in the 1998 
case, or the regional courts in the 2008-2009 cases, allowed Sahrawi applicants to retain their 
citizenship and apply for updated documentation, there would have been a significant increase in 
applications to retain – and pass on – Spanish citizenship.104 Aside from the economic 
implications of granting a large portion of people citizenship, there are also international 
relations to consider. If Spain were to accept these applications or extend citizenship to previous 
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Spanish citizens from Western Sahara, then it would have to take a stand on the human rights 
violations that occur in the region, altering Spain’s relations with Morocco, an important 
partner.105 
In an article he wrote for the Spanish Ministry of Defense, Ruiz Miguel highlights that 
Spain withdrew from Western Sahara quickly, transferring administrative power to Morocco and 
Mauritania as listed above, before leaving the territory entirely. This act was directly against the 
United Nations Charter which forbade Spain from abandoning administrative control over 
Western Sahara during decolonization without warning.106 Spain’s Supreme Court, by ignoring 
ruling on the legitimacy of Royal Decree 2258/1976, avoids drawing attention to the 
questionable application of a lesser law – a royal decree – over the Civil Code of the time and the 
hasty withdrawal from Western Sahara and subsequent forty years of attempted negotiations on 
an self-determination referendum. If Spain were forced to acknowledge its hasty removal from 
Western Sahara, it would face being thrown headfirst into negotiations over the territory’s 
occupation and negatively impact relations with Morocco. Ruiz Miguel claims in a separate 
article, that Spain’s supposed transition from administrative power was abrupt and the United 
Nations did not recognize the Madrid Accord, in which Spain created the triumvirate agreement 
with Morocco and Mauritania, as having ended Spain’s administrative duties in Western 
Sahara.107 He reaches this conclusion because as a result of the debate Spain’s Madrid Accord 
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caused, the United Nations issued two resolutions on the matter. In the first, resolution 3458 A, 
the U.N. refers to Spain as the administrative power of the region. This resolution was made after 
the Madrid Accord that created the triumvirate.108 Most scholars take for granted Spain’s transfer 
of administrative powers to Morocco and simply state it as a fact,109 however Ruiz Miguel shows 
that the General Assembly of the U.N. did not consider the transfer of administrative power to 
Mauritania and Morocco valid, as they continued to call Spain the administrative power five 
times in this resolution.110 In resolution 3458 B the U.N. takes note of the triumvirate agreement, 
but neither endorses nor approves it, saying that there must be a referendum in which all 
Sahrawis originally from the territory have the option to vote for self-determination.111 Since 
Sahrawis never were allowed their referendum, the process of decolonization never fully took 
place.112 If this take on the legality of the Spanish transfer of administrative powers is to be 
taken, then Spain’s transfer of power was never legally recognized by the U.N. This would mean 
that Spain still has an obligation to ensure Western Sahara has the right to a self-determining 
referendum and is still involved in the region, which would directly place Spain in a position 
where it is expected to broker a peace deal between Morocco, the SADR, and the U.N. Spain’s 
relations with Morocco would suffer for such involvement and the implications for the E.U. and 
post-colonial space in North Africa would change drastically. This also explains why Spain’s 
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Supreme Court never addressed the legitimacy of Royal Decree 2258/1976 when addressing the 
cases regarding Sahrawi citizenship rights. If Spain had ruled that the royal decree was 
illegitimate, then Spain would have to take responsibility for a large amount of displaced 
Sahrawis who would have the right to retain citizenship and pass it on to their children. Opening 
legal dialogue surrounding the decolonization of Western Sahara and its people’s right to 
Spanish nationality and protection would add urgency to the already tense situation surround 
Western Sahara’s current political situation. This is likely why Spain slipped Article 21.1 into its 
civil code of 1982. Article 21.1 establishes that “Spanish nationality is acquired by letter of 
naturalization, issued discretionally by Royal Decree, when in the applicant has exceptional 
circumstances.”113 There is no previous mention of the weight of Royal Decrees found in the 
1975 version of the Civil Code,114 yet the inclusion of this clause in the 1982 Civil Code attempts 
to add legal legitimacy to the exclusion or inclusion of some people from Spain’s citizenship 
scheme. Western Sahara is a clear application of this exception. Royal Decree 2258/1976 and the 
circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of Spain from Western Sahara are certainly 
exceptional, given the hasty removal from the region and Spain’s withdrawal of citizenship of 
thousands of Spaniards by origin facing extenuating circumstances. 
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Spain’s Current Stance Continued: Addressing the Issue, or Prolonging the Uncertainty? 
The research from the beginning of 2014 and before focused on this issue and Spain’s 
unwillingness to address the “…loophole in nationality law.”115 Research has not caught up to 
the recent developments in Spanish citizenship law regarding the issue of Western Sahara, which 
refutes Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes’s earlier assertion that Spain’s government would not 
touch the issue before a Sahrawi self-determination referendum.116 Though this point was an 
appropriately educated assertion based on the evidence before 2015 with the popularity of the 
Sephardic case, current events alter the previous reality. In 2016, the Congreso de los Diputados, 
Spain’s lower court within its legislative branch (Parliament), voted on a non-legal proposition to 
amend article 22.1 of the Civil Code to allow people from Western Sahara their long-denied right 
to apply for Spanish citizenship the same way other applicants from previous colonies and 
Sephardic Jews can.117 A proposición no de ley, (PNL) or non-legal proposition is a 
parliamentary initiative in which parliamentary groups put forth proposed resolutions about a 
legal matter or suggest action on a given issue.118 The proposition was introduced by the Mixed 
Parliamentary Group and calls for the clarification of legal language surrounding the issue of 
Sahrawis’ access to Spanish nationality through Article 22.1 of the Civil Code. In the session, 
Mr. Serna argues that Western Sahara formed an integral part of Spain until its abandonment, 
and that the Sahrawi community should be “…recognized…as an integral part of the community 
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of diverse peoples that in the passing of history have maintained an intense relationship with 
those who are currently governed by Spanish laws.”119 It goes on to claim that Spain has an 
obligation to those who used to be Spaniards and that the extension of citizenship could help 
alleviate the effect of human rights violations as it did in World War II when some Sephardic 
Jews – who had been granted citizenship or protection before the war – benefitted from this 
protection.120  The main speaker clarifies that the PNL does not seek to change current refugee 
and asylum policy nor make anyone change their nationality, but rather show that the Spanish 
government is willing to recognize a population who has legislatively been forgotten by Spain.121 
The following declarations of support by other parliamentary groups cite the points argued by 
scholars in and before 2014, with Representative Capella citing Royal Decree 2258/1976 and 
how it denied Spanish nationals by origin of their citizenship.122 The other parliamentary groups 
express their overwhelming support for the PNL, showing that Spanish political parties actually 
do voice their stance on Western Sahara, directly contradicting Martín Pérez and Moreno 
Fuentes’s statement that Spain’s parties will not touch the issue before a referendum provided no 
large changes occur in the region. In this PNL there is overwhelming support for Western 
Sahara’s inclusion in Spain’s citizenship exceptions and parties acknowledge previous 
negligence and Spain’s history of unclear resolution on the law. Ciudadanos’ parliamentary 
group goes as far as to say that Spain is still the U.N.-recognized administrative power of 
Western Sahara and that if exceptions are made for Sephardim to apply for expedited citizenship 
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based off of historical wrongs that was committed in 1492, then Spain should make the same 
exceptions for cases far closer, historically.123 The points made about Western Sahara’s omission 
from Spain’s citizenship exceptions and the implication of Spain being the recognized 
administrative power in a region still pending decolonization point to some of the inconsistencies 
in Spain’s system and represent the first time the lower chamber of Parliament openly confronts 
the issue. 
In April 2017, a year after the PNL was released, the Congreso de los Diputados 
addressed the issue again, this time with legal proposals for amendment to citizenship articles of 
the Civil Code, though the political parties do not have a uniform agreement on which sections 
of the law to change and what wording should be used. The majority of the parties request 
amendment to Article 22.1,124 which currently establishes legal concession of citizenship by 
residence to all of Spain’s other exceptional cases,125 to include Western Sahara. Two 
parliamentary groups propose Article 23 be altered to allow Sahrawis to retain their previous 
nationality, just as the other special cases within Spain’s citizenship scheme.126 One group argues 
that Western Sahara belongs in the group of exceptions based on being a historically Spanish 
community and in obtaining or regaining nationality should not be required to lose previous 
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citizenship due to this connection and the unresolved nature of the Western Saharan conflict.127 
A few groups specifically call for the recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s 
identification documents in citizenship applications.128 
The latest proof that Spain’s government is consistently addressing the issue of Western 
Sahara’s exclusion from the exceptional cases within its citizenship scheme comes in the form of 
a letter written in October 2018. Representative Enric Bataller i Ruiz, one of the Mixed 
Parliament Group leaders involved in the 2017 proposition, responds to a query about the 
eligibility of Sahrawis to apply for Spanish citizenship.129 Despite being the third consecutive 
document regarding the issue, the response is somewhat baffling, since there is no official 
resolution to the issue. Instead of keeping in line with criticism from 2016 and 2017 on Royal 
Decree 2258/1976, it reestablishes its validity by stating that those who complied with its 
requirement to apply with Spanish civil registries in the given one-year timeframe, legally 
maintained their citizenship and the rights to citizenship documentation.130 There is no mention 
of the decree’s mass removal of citizenship from Spanish citizens by origin. However, the 
document clarifies that in cases where the applicant had up-to-date Spanish paperwork during a 
ten-year period, as in the 1998 Supreme Court case, and was unable to appear before Spanish 
authorities to exercise their right to retain citizenship because they resided in the part of Western 
Sahara occupied by Morocco, then they can apply to renew their documents.131 Breaking with 
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previous discourse on the issue, Congress points to Article 22.2 of the Civil Code, which allows 
those born on Spanish territory, regardless of colonial status, the right to Spanish citizenship 
following one year of legal residency in Spain.132  
The letter does finally address the issue of the lack of universal recognition of SADR 
identification documents in Spain when applied to citizenship cases, stating that though Spain 
does not recognize the SADR, that does not mean it rejects its birth certificates and background 
checks, which are fit for citizenship applications with Spanish authorities.133 Adding to the 
confusion, the letter cites a 2015 document which allows for these documents to be recognized, 
though Congressmembers the year before did not think the documents were universally, 
officially recognized by the Spanish government.134 This letter demonstrates the level of 
confusion that unconsolidated and uncomprehensive citizenship law applications have on this 
case. The letter does not address the proposed changes to Article 22.1, and it explicitly states that 
Article 23, allowing the other cases the right to retain their previous citizenship, has not been 
sufficiently studied and requires more technical analysis before it can be applied to Western 
Sahara.135 The letter presents no comprehensive solution, or even promise of comprehensive 
solution, to the inequality still present in Spain’s exceptional citizenship cases. Spain still 
excludes Western Sahara from the list of countries and peoples with special ties to Spain despite 
a clear link to Spanish citizenship and history. These three updates are crucial to understanding 
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how the field is changing, though they do not necessarily imply that the loophole in Spain’s 
citizenship scheme will be addressed before a referendum.  
Issue Unresolved: A Changing Dynamic 
 If Spain recognized Western Sahara’s right to special status in the Civil Code to match 
the other two exceptional cases, then why has it still not ruled on the proposed laws and why did 
2018 not yield more depth to the issue in the legislature than the October letter? Previous 
research on the aforementioned legitimacy of Royal Decree 2258/1976 and Spain’s negation of 
sole administrative power over the region is important, but given Spain’s long-term acceptance 
of the decree and the decree’s coexistence with calls to reform, it is not likely to be reformed by 
the government, despite ready criticism. The reason, as previous scholars show, is multifaceted, 
but boils down to the fact that Spain has conflicting interests in the region today. Spain and 
Morocco have a history of trade agreements that benefit Morocco at the expense of Western 
Sahara, subverting Spain’s claim to support a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara 
and even international law. The U.N. does not recognize any transfer of power to Morocco to 
constitute a transfer of administrative power, explicitly stating that Morocco is not the 
administrative power of Western Sahara.136 While it also has not explicitly declared that Spain is 
the administrative power of the region in a resolution, the Undersecretary General for Legal 
Affairs of the U.N. reaffirmed the illegitimacy of the supposed transfer of administrative powers 
to Morocco and Mauritania, and Spain still acts as the administrative power in the region’s 
airspace and maritime search and rescue.137 Because part of Western Sahara is occupied by 
Morocco and the other part is led by the SADR, it is unclear what exactly Spain’s role should be 
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in the territory, as there are competing competencies in the region138 and no resolution in sight to 
the conflict. 
Another complicating factor is Spain’s complicity in fishing and exploitative trade 
agreements with Morocco in Western Sahara. If Spain is still the administrative power of the 
region, then it ought to be ensuring the economic development and benefit to people indigenous 
to the territory,139 but regardless of whether it is or is not considered the administrative power, 
Spain is involved in the exploitation of natural resources such as phosphate, fish, sand and 
agriculture.140 In 2006, The European Union and Morocco signed a fishing agreement highly 
beneficial to the two parties that allowed for fishing off the coast of Western Sahara without 
consideration of the region’s contested nature. Spain was highly supportive of the deal, which 
did not benefit the local Sahrawi population.141 In line with trends noted by scholars before 2014, 
another fishing deal was struck between Morocco and the E.U. in 2018, including the waters off 
the coast of Western Sahara despite a ruling by the European Court of Justice earlier that year 
ruling that fishery deals between Morocco and the E.U. could not include the waters off Western 
Sahara.142 “Of the 126 European boats with licenses to fish under the existing agreement, 90 are 
Spanish,”143 meaning that Spain disproportionately benefits from the deal. The European 
Commission maintains the legality of the deal based on 2016 rulings allowing Western Sahara to 
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be included in trade deals if indigenous Sahrawis benefitted from it, yet the Polisario Front says 
it is prepared to sue over the deal.144 In 2019, European Parliament passed a proposal to lower 
tariffs on trade goods from Western Sahara to benefit the local population, in what is likely an 
attempt to cover their bases, promoting economic development in the region while restating their 
commitment to a peaceful political solution and preserving close trade relations with Morocco.145 
Despite the European Union’s claims that it supports a peace deal in Western Sahara, the trade 
deal implicitly recognizes Morocco’s occupational borders as part of the agreement. Even E.U. 
foreign affairs officials have acknowledged that the deal appears to recognize Morocco’s claimed 
borders.146 This trend continues the complicated relationship Spain has with Morocco and 
Western Sahara that researchers previously believed would keep Spain’s political parties from 
addressing the issue. 
The importance of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish outposts in northern Morocco must 
also be taken into consideration. Spain has long been concerned with its hold over the region and 
signed several agreements in November 1975 before its withdrawal that assured its continued 
presence in both outposts, with the understanding that it was important to have pro-Western 
presence in a region threatened by anti-Western forces.147 Morocco claimed to be assuring 
Western security with its presence in Western Sahara until 1989.148 During that time period, 
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Spain was incentivized to maintain the status quo in the region and avoid conflict. This 
relationship was also addressed in 2018, while discussing the fishing trade deal, Morocco’s 
ambassador to the E.U. highlighted the importance of Morocco’s efforts to ensure border 
security around the two Spanish cities, saying that, “‘Morocco has always been there and a 
reliable partner [for the E.U]. It’s that spirit that prevails so there isn’t any blackmail. However, 
we won’t sign any agreement with any country – EU or not – that doesn’t include Western 
Sahara.’”149 Though this claims there is no blackmail, an E.U. fisheries official cites Morocco as 
having threatened to halt cooperation on immigration and security, though he states these threats 
are blank since the E.U. is Morocco’s biggest trading partner and the two rely on each other.150 
This adds another layer of uncertainty surrounding policy in Western Sahara and Morocco. 
Spain’s interests in the region stand on increasingly uncertain ground. This again seems to 
support previous research stating Spain will not address the issue comprehensively until there is 
a referendum. 
Spain’s own legislative parties tend to link the incongruence in its citizenship policy with 
Spain’s responsibility in Western Sahara. The technical study referenced in Congress’s 2018 
letter will have to focus on the implications of Spain’s inclusion of Western Sahara in full 
equality with the other two exceptional cases. Various political parties in the Congreso de los 
Diputados 2016 PNL call for renewed support of a peaceful solution to Western Sahara’s 
occupation, renewed efforts for a referendum, and mentions Spain is still the U.N.-recognized 
administrative authority.151 Despite these claims, representative Fernando García highlights the 
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need to wait until the “right moment” for the government to enact the proposed changes, stating 
that the moment is not now.152 The proposition for amendment to Article 22.1 in 2017, pokes 
more holes in Spain’s citizenship scheme by showing that many Sahrawis were forced to flee 
without warning when Morocco invaded, which contributed to the loss of documents based on 
extenuating circumstances, making loss of citizenship even less fair.153 It highlights that 
citizenship by origin was removed,154 which as previously established went against the Civil 
Code. The document reiterates Spain’s moral obligation to bring about peace in the region,155 yet 
there is still no definitive resolution on the exclusion of Western Sahara from Spain’s privileged 
citizenship exceptions. The same legislature’s 2018 letter addressing the issue reflects the 
confusion and lack of resources lent to studying the issue so far. The complexities surrounding 
Western Sahara seem too much at present to take on, with other problems Spain is facing and the 
implications of being further outwardly implicated in a prolonged decolonization process in 
Africa. Recognizing Western Sahara’s right to citizenship and extending them rights is part of an 
intricate balance of policy in the region. If Spain recognizes Western Sahara in a more 
comprehensive way, it risks tipping the balance of its policy in the region between Morocco and 
Western Sahara. Though there has been increased recognition and calls to amend the 
incongruence in Spain’s citizenship law since the 2015 changes regarding the Sephardic right of 
return that brought Spain’s citizenship exceptions to the world stage, it is probable that, like 
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Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes suggest, Spain will not act on these propositions because of 
uncertainty regarding the unresolved status of Western Sahara and will not until the time is 
deemed fitting. Given the continued complicated relationship between Morocco, Spain, and 
Western Sahara, one would be inclined to agree with Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes, at least 
to the extent that the issue will not comprehensively be resolved before a referendum or large 
political change in the region – though it has clearly been addressed in a way they did not 
necessarily anticipate. However, though previous research and continued delicate relationships 
between the countries suggest the complications surrounding Western Sahara’s political position 
are reason enough to keep Spain from touching the Civil Code, Spain’s government has deviated 
from what previous researches expected, increasingly discussing the loophole that Martín Pérez 
and Moreno Fuentes insist will not be touched by Spanish political parties or government.156 
While it is still possible that Spain will wait for a peaceful solution between Western Sahara and 
Morocco to finally comprehensively address the rights of Sahrawis to expedited Spanish 
citizenship, given recent, consistent changes to the way Spanish government addresses the issue, 
there is now more room for the possibility that Spain will address the issue before there is a 
referendum. Because Spain has recently behaved in a way that is inconsistent with its previous 
seemingly path-dependent neglection of Western Sahara as a citizenship exception, there is now 
room for scholars to debate whether or not Spain will actually change its Civil Code before a 
referendum occurs. The October 2018 letter to Congress does not provide a definitive answer as 
to a date Spain might consider the change, or even when the investigation of the implications of 
such a change might occur, so it could also reasonably be argued that Spain will, despite 
critically addressing the loophole, continue to play the waiting game. Whatever the logic behind 
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the argument held by previous researchers and supported by the ambiguity of the 2018 letter, it 
cannot be definitively said if Spain will or will not act on the incongruence in its law before a 
referendum in Western Sahara. The situation is still developing and is too unpredictable, 
especially since a change to the Civil Code has been addressed by the lower chamber of 
Parliament and could be voted on at any time. What can be said is that Spain is now actively 
talking about the loophole pointed out by Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes in a way they 
understandably did not think possible at the time of their article’s publication.  
Conclusion 
Spain has done perhaps what it’s best known for in this particular case: using the 
ambiguous application of law to legitimize its interests abroad. Though some Sahrawis have 
regained their citizenship since 2017, it is because of lesser courts’ interpretation of the Supreme 
Court rulings rather than a change in the Civil Code, and Western Saharan identification 
documents are only sometimes accepted by the civil registry.157 Spain has not yet granted all 
Western Saharans the right to citizenship and it is possible it will not until there is a self-
determining referendum in the territory, but for now those who can prove their previous 
citizenship appear to be granted the right to it after one year of residence – in theory – according 
to Congreso de los Diputados’s 2018 letter.158 There is not a consistent application of the law 
and there is still work to be done regarding that issue. Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes’s 
assertion that the issue would remain unaddressed by Spanish political parties before a 
significant change in North Africa has proven to be incorrect, though it was an understandable 
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position, given the research available at the time and Spain’s public neglect of the issue. Recent 
economic and political developments pressure Spain to maintain the status quo, similar to the 
situation at the time of the authors’ research. Despite recent documents from Spain’s Congreso 
de los Diputados, acknowledging Spain’s responsibility in the region and the hole in Spain’s 
citizenship scheme, it is tempting to say that Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes’ assertion 
regarding a comprehensive solution to the issue holds true, given the government’s reticence to 
act. Martín Pérez and Moreno Fuentes’s assertion that as long as Western Sahara’s political 
future remains in limbo, Spain will maintain its present incongruence in citizenship law that 
allows Sephardic Jews and people from previous colonies citizenship except for those from 
Western Sahara,159 may well prove true with time, but given recent changes, this can no longer 
be taken for granted as fact.  With the last primary source having been published only in October 
2018, it cannot be taken for granted that this is still a developing issue and could continue to 
change over the next few years, given how much momentum has built since 2016. The problem 
is that granting all Sahrawis privileged citizenship rights means opposing Morocco politically or 
regaining administrative control over the territory, which would inevitably lead to conflict with 
Morocco, the current occupier, and throw Spain (and with it the E.U.) into a territorial dispute in 
North Africa decades after the region was supposed to be decolonized. While a resolution to the 
problem remains to be seen, developments in 2016-2018 alter previously held beliefs about 
Spain remaining mute on the issue and call into question the future of Spain’s stance on officially 
reconciling its Civil Code with current political thought on the clear precedent to include 
Western Sahara in Spain’s citizenship exceptions. 
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